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the basis of a card majority may refuse and require the union to
petition for an election. 3 However, it will be interesting to observe
the Board's reaction to those still zealous employers who choose to
embark upon a preelection campaign at the risk of crossing that
imaginary Gissel line drawn between those unfair labor practices
that do or do not invalidate an election.
MARIE C. GROSSMAN
ANTITRUST LAW - GROUP BOYCOTTS - PRIVATE
ASSOCIATIONS
Marjorie Webster junior College, Inc. v. Middle
States Association of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc.,
302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969).
When the term "accredited" is applied to an educational institu-
tion, one may correctly assume that because the institution has met
certain minimum standards of quality, the credits or degrees that it
awards will be generally accepted at face value. Given the fact
that much of society has made education a prerequisite to participa-
tion in its most lucrative occupations, the desirability of attending
an accredited institution is greatly enhanced. The organizations
responsible for accrediting institutions of higher learning therefore
possess the power to control each institution's access to its very life-
blood - a capable student body. Liberal arts institutions are ac-
credited by six regional associations, which, until recently, have ex-
ercised their power with complete autonomy. The question of
whether the power of these associations to promulgate and enforce
educational standards is subject to judicial supervision was recently
presented to the District Court for the District of Columbia in
Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Association
of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc.1
Marjorie Webster Junior College (Webster) is a junior college
for women located in the District of Columbia. Middle States As-
sociation of Colleges and Secondary Schools (Middle States), a pri-
vate, voluntary, nonprofit educational association, is one of the six
as This was the result in Aaron Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966). However,
an employer may be forced to bargain if he has independent knowledge of the union's
majority or if he refuses to bargain because he doubts the appropriateness of the unit
rather than the existence of a majority. 395 U.S. at 594.
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-regional accrediting associations in the United States, and, as such,
exercises a regional monopoly over the accreditation of liberal arts
institutions. Although it had been accredited by the District of
Columbia since 1947, Webster sought recognition by Middle States
because accreditation by such regional associations is viewed more
favorably by both educators and the public. One of Middle States'
eligibility criteria prescribed that only nonprofit institutions would
be considered for accreditation. Because Webster is a proprietary
corporation, Middle States refused to evaluate it for accreditation.
Thereupon, Webster brought an action to enjoin Middle States
from applying its nonprofit criterion, seeking relief under two
separate counts.
The first count invoked the injunctive relief which section 16 of
the Clayton Act2 provides for parties threatened with injury result-
ing from restraints of trade in violation of section 3 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.8 The second count sought identical relief based upon
both the due process clause of the fifth amendment and the com-
mon law of private associations. The court granted relief under
each count, holding that Middle States' nonprofit criterion both
constituted a restraint of trade in violation of section 3 of the Sher-
man Act and represented an arbitrary requirement which, when im-
posed by a 'quasi-governmental organization, violated the fifth
amendment's due process requirement and the common law proscrip-
tion against arbitrary exclusion from private associations.
1302 F. Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1969).
2 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964), which provides: "Any person, firm, corporation, or associa-
tion shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United
States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a viola-
don of the antitrust laws .... "
3 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sherman Act], which provides: "Every
contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce in... the District of Columbia... is declared illegal." In effect, the section
applies the proscriptions of section 1 to the District of Columbia and the territories,
thereby obviating the section 1 requirement that the restraint involve interstate commerce.
When the challenging institution is located in a state, the interstate commerce require-
ment could be construed so as to bar recovery under the Act. While undoubtedly non-
residents will comprise a significant portion of the plaintiffs student body, it has been
held that students who travel from one state to another to attend a university are not part
of interstate commerce. Marston v. Ann Arbor Property Managers Ass'n, 302 F. Supp.
1276 (E.D. Mich. 1969). The reasoning of the Marston court is less than convincing
when one considers the Supreme Court's expansive interpretations of the scope of inter-
state commerce. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
However, antitrust actions have been dismissed on the ground that the effect on inter-
state commerce was not substantial. Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d
269 (2d Cir. 1964); Page v. Work, 290 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
875 (1961); Elizabeth Hospital, Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
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Because section 3 of the Act prohibits only restraints of "trade
or commerce," the Webster court was presented with a case of first
impression: Whether an institution of higher learning is en-
gaged in trade within the context of the Act? The traditional def-
inition of trade was given by Mr. Justice Story in The Nymph:"
"Whenever any occupation, employment, or business is carried
on for the purpose of profit, or gain or a livelihood, not in the lib-
eral arts or the learned professions, it is constantly called a trade."'
In United States v. American Medical Association,6 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit made a significant
departure from the Nymph definition, holding that the practice of
medicine constituted trade under the Act.7  However, it relied
heavily on Mr. Chief Justice White's statement in Standard Oil Co.
v. United States,' an early landmark in the antitrust area, that the
Act covered those restraints of trade that were recognized at com-
4 18 F. Cas. 506 (No. 10,388) (C.C.D. Me. 1834).
51d. at 507 (emphasis added). In The Nymph, Mr. Justice Story concluded that
the word trade, as used in the statute, included a mackeral fishery. Within the context
of the Act, the Nymph definition was adopted by the Supreme Court in Atlantic
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436 (1932), and United States
v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 492 (1950). In both cases the def-
inition was used to expand the concept of trade - to include dry cleaners and real
estate brokers - rather than to contract it. Thus, in each case the exclusion of the
liberal arts and the learned professions from the definition can be regarded as dictum.
6 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940).
7 In AMA, Group Health Association was a nonprofit cooperative, practicing con-
tract medicine in the District of Columbia. In order to discourage the practice of con-
tract medicine, the local branch of the American Medical Association threatened to -
and in some instances did - expel members who worked for Group Health, or who
consulted with Group Health physicians. Further, it coerced the area hospitals into
depriving Group Health's patients of the use of their facilities. The Association was
charged, under the criminal provisions of the Act [15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964)] with con-
spiring to restrain Group Health's trade. The district court sustained a demurrer to
the indictment, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that Group Health was en-
gaged in trade under the Act [110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 644
(1940)], and sent the case back for trial. The Association was convicted, and the
conviction was affirmed. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233
(D.C. Cir. 1942), affd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). In affirming the conviction, the Su-
preme Court sustained the finding that Group Health was engaged in trade under the
Act. 317 U.S. at 528. But see United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 95 F. Supp.
103 (D. Ore. 1950), aff'd, 343 U.S. 326 (1952), where the district court found that
prepaid medical plans did not constitute trade or commerce within the meaning of the
Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, but on the ground
that since the government failed to prove a concerted refusal to deal on the part of the
defendants, the Court did not have to decide whether such a refusal would violate the
antitrust laws. 343 U.S. at 336. It held that the district court's finding that the pre-
paid medical plans were not a part of interstate commerce was not dearly erroneous,
but it refrained from discussing the district court's finding that the medical plans did
not constitute trade. See also Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d
266 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 954 (1958).
8221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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mon law.9 At common law the unreasonable restraint of a physi-
dan's practice did constitute a restraint of trade.'0 Thus, although
AMA expanded the traditional definition of trade to include some
professional activity, it impliedly restricted that expansion to those
activities that were actionable restraints at common law: Accredita-
tion was not such an activity.
The Webster court focused on the expansive trend established
by the aforementioned decisions rather than upon the decisions'
technical rationales. After noting that "[t]he indubitable effects
of all these cases, English and American, is to enlarge the common
acceptance of the word 'trade' when embraced in the phrase 're-
straint of trade' to cover all occupations in which men are engaged
for a livelihood,"" the court proceeded to review the trade aspects
of higher education. It mentioned some of the ancillary indicia of
trade - faculty salaries, building programs, dining halls, and book-
stores - before coming to the crux of the issue:
Webster is a corporation engaged in business for profit. Its corpo-
rate activity consists of offering educational facilities and services
in exchange for the tuition charged students .... Middle States
can hardly deny that plaintiff is engaged in trade since the plain-
tiff's proprietary character is the reason for the membership ex-
dusion and the sine qua non of this proceeding.' 2
Because Webster's fact situation restricts to proprietary schools
the court's determination of who is engaged in trade under the Act,
its language respecting higher education in general must be regarded
as dictum. But even this narrow interpretation would expand the
meaning of the word trade beyond the scope of that term as orig-
inally envisaged by Congress. 'While it can be safely assumed that
Congress did not have the plight of unaccredited junior colleges in
mind when it drafted the Act I3 it did have in mind the public
9 Id. at 59.
10 See Pratt v. British Medical Ass'n, [1919] 1 KB. 244 (1918). See also Atkyns
v. Kinnier, 154 Eng. Rep. 1429 (Ex. 1850); Hayward v. Young, 2 Chitty 407 (KB.
1818); Davis v. Mason, 101 Eng. Rep. 69 (K.B. 1793). The issue usually arose when
a physician took on an apprentice who then contracted with the physician not to prac-
tice independently, within a specified area, for a designated number of years. If the ap-
prentice breached the contract, the physician would bring an action on a bond made by
the apprentice to insure his compliance. The apprentice would then defend on the
ground that the contract constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.
1The court was quoting from United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d
703, 710 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940).
12 302 F. Supp. at 466.
13 The legislative history of the Act is summarized in I H. TOULMIN, ANTi-
TRusT LAws 1-23 (1949). The Act was directed at the large combinations of capital
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interest in free and open competition. 14  Given the preferred posi-
tion of education in today's society, the public interest in unre-
stricted competition in that area is manifest. Thus, because the
Webster court was faced with both an injury to a private business
entity' 5 and a consequent public injury, the inclusion of proprie-
tary educational institutions within the ambit of the word trade does
not represent an unwarranted extension of the Act.'6
Once the threshold issue of trade vel non is answered in the af-
firmative, in order for a violation of the Act to occur, there must
also exist a "contract, combination or conspiracy' '1 7 in restraint of
that trade. In Webster this requirement was easily met. Because
membership in Middle States was concomitant with accreditation,
the accredited members of Middle States constituted the requisite
"combination." Further, in view of the fact that no specific intent
is required to find a violation of the Act,'8 it was of no consequence
which had accumulated after the civil war and were stifling competition. See, e.g., 21
CONG. RE_ 2456-57 (1890) (remarks of Senator Sherman).
1 4 See I H. TOULMIN, supra note 13, at 96 n.11. See also Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 490 n.11 (1940).
15 Webster offers 2-year terminal and transfer courses. The students enrolled in
the transfer course usually plan to transfer to a 4-year institution after graduating from
Webster. As a result of Webster's lack of regional accreditation, complications could
arise when its students attempt to transfer their credits earned at Webster. Foresee-
ing these complications, a student will be less likely to attend Webster than a simi-
lar but accredited junior college. Thus, it can be argued that Webster is operating at a
competitive disadvantage in its recruitment of students, and this is sufficient injury
to entitle it to the protection of the Act. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,
17 (1945); see Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 347 (1963).
16 A more difficult question will arise, however, if, under the antitrust laws, a
nonprofit school charges a regional accrediting agency with arbitrary action. In find-
ing that hospitals in the District of Columbia were engaged in trade under the Act,
the court in American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942),
said: "It is not necessary, in order to constitute trade or business, that it shall be carried
on for a profit." Id. at 237. Practically all colleges and universities provide educational
services in exchange for their students' tuition and they actively compete in the recruit-
ment of these students. The public injury that results from restraints on competition
in the educational field is no less severe because a nonprofit school is restrained. The
fact that all of the funds received by nonprofit institutions are invested in the educational
process - rather than only partly so with the remainder in the pockets of the trustees -
should not deprive them of the protection of the Act. Although there is language in
Webster which can be read to favor the extension of the term trade to all higher educa-
tion [302 F. Supp. at 465-66], the holding is necessarily restricted to its facts. If and
when a court upholds an action under the Act by a nonprofit school, that court will have
to set definable limits to the expansion of the trade definition.
17 See note 3 supra.
18United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948):
It is, however, not always necessary to find a specific intent to restrain trade
or to build a monopoly in order to find that the anti-trust laws have been
violated. It is sufficient that a restraint of trade or monopoly results as the
consequence of a defendant's conduct or business arrangements.
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that the members of Middle States did not combine for the express
purpose of restraining Webster's trade.
Although Middle States was literally a "combination," there re-
mained the question of whether the Act should be applied against
a salutary organization whose raison d'6tre is public service. The
Act traditionally has been invoked against commercially oriented
restraints of trade - situations wherein the party applying the re-
straint received some economic benefit. 9 Apart from being non-
commercially oriented, Middle States performs a highly necessary
and valuable function: It exists only to set standards through
which the quality of an institution's educational product can be de-
termined, and to aid institutions in achieving, maintaining, and im-
proving that quality. There are, however, no analytical reasons
why the Act should not be applied to noncommercial restraints.
Section 3 prohibits every combination in restraint of trade,20 and
when an association such as Middle States possesses monopoly power
in an area of vital public concern, it is important that it not act
arbitrarily. Thus, in the absence of a more adequate remedy,21 the
Act provides a vehicle for controlling both economically oriented
and service-minded organizations.
When a "combination" has been identified, the courts have ap-
plied one of two theories in determining the type of conduct which
constitutes a violation of the Act. First, certain agreements or prac-
tices, because of their inherent anticompetitive nature and total
lack of redeeming qualities, have been held illegal per se.22 In such
situations, when prohibited conduct is found, the Act's sanctions
have been invoked without consideration of whether the activity
was reasonable under the particular circumstances.2 3  A -second
19 See Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L.
REV. 705 (1962). In Council of Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 F. 390 (8th
Cir. 1920), the court held that a boycott of Hearst publications in the State of New
Mexico was prohibited by the Act. The patriotic Council of Defense was retaliating
against Mr. Hearst, because of antiwar comments appearing in his newspapers, by dis-
couraging the distribution and purchase of his publications throughout New Mexico.
This is the only Sherman Act case involving a restraint of trade for a purely noncom-
mercial purpose.
20 See note 3 supra.
21 See text accompanying note 47 infra.
2 See, e.g., KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group
boycotts); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying arrangements);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price fixing); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), af 'd, 175 U.S. 211
(1899) (division of markets).
23 In United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969), Mr.
Justice Marshall, dissenting, remarked:
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theory applied by the courts is the so-called "rule of reason." Un-
der this rationale, the courts reason that all commercial agreements
restrain trade to some extent. Thus, when the activity in issue does
not fall within one of the per se categories, the courts have con-
sidered the reasonableness of the restraint in light of the surround-
ing circumstances,24 and only restraints found unreasonable after
such an examination have been held to violate the Act.25
The situation presented in Webster was, in antitrust terms, a
"concerted refusal to deal," or "group boycott." In applying its
nonprofit criterion, Middle States refused to deal with, or boycot-
ted, Webster. Although the Supreme Court has applied the per se
rule to group boycotts, 26 the lower federal courts have narrowly
construed the rule, demonstrating their preference for the rule of
reason. 7  This reluctance to apply the per se rule is quite justifi-
able in view of the wide variety of practices which have been termed
group boycotts .2  For example, in Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
They [per se rules] are justified on the assumption that the gains from im-
position of the rule will far outweigh the losses and that significant admin-
istrative advantages will result. In other words, the potential competitive
harm plus the administrative costs of determining in what particular situa-
tions the practice may be harmful must far outweigh the benefits that may
result. If the potential benefits in the aggregate are outweighed to this de-
gree, then they are simply not worth identifying in individual cases.
24The guidelines for determining reasonableness set down by MLr. Justice Brandeis
in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), are often utilized by
courts when implementing the rule of reason:
[Tihe court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint, and its effect actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts. Id. at 238.
25 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
26$ee Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1940).
27See Deesen v. Professional Golfer's Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.
1966); Roofire Alarm Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 202 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tenn. 1962),
ajt'd, 313 F.2d 635 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963).
28No court would seriously consider applying the per se rule to every practice
which can be brought within the term "group boycott." Certainly a basketball league
can reasonably refuse to employ a player who has bet on games. Cf. Molinas v. Na-
tional Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). And a golfer's association
can reasonably refuse to allow an unqualified nonmember to compete in its tournaments.
Deesen v. Professional Golfer's Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966). In
each of these situations there exists a concerted refusal to deal with the plaintiff on the
part of the members of the association.
An even better example of the inapplicability of a blanket per se approach can be
drawn from Radiant Burners v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
In Radiant, the defendant association (AGA) operated laboratories which tested gas
burners for, among other things, safety. When a burner passed the tests it received
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Stores, Inc.29 and Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC"
- leading cases which have applied the per se rule - there were
unique elements involved. In Klors, the defendant department
store chain used its great buying power to coerce manufacturers and
distributors of appliances not to sell to Klor's, or only to sell to it on
discriminatory terms, thereby attempting to drive Klor's out of the
market. In Fashion Originators, the defendant guild was composed
of manufacturers and designers of women's clothing and the textiles
from which such clothing is made. They purposely refused to deal
with retailers who sold garments made by manufacturers who had
copied the guild's unpatented designs. The guild established exten-
sive machinery to impose punitive measures on those members who
deviated from its rules. A court would understandably be reluc-
tant to apply a per se rule in cases where there is neither direct coer-
cion, as in Kior's, nor a regulatory body perscribing rules and admin-
istering penalties, as in Fashion Originators. Moreover, in cases
such as Webster, where there is not only a lack of coercion, but also
a socially beneficial purpose involved, there is even less reason for
application of the per se approach. 1
The Webster court adopted the rule of reason approach, and,
after a trial lasting almost 3 months, found that Middle States acted
arbitrarily and unreasonably in refusing to evaluate Webster for ac-
creditation. The court stated:
the AGA's "seal of approval." The public utilities in the area, who were members
of the AGA, refused to provide gas for those burners which had not been approved.
Plaintiff's burner had been submitted for approval twice, but with no success. It was
thus effectively excluded from the market because consumers will not buy burners
for which they cannot obtain gas. The district court dismissed the complaint, but the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the refusal to provide plaintiff's burners with gas
was a per se violation. Taking the plaintiff's allegations to be true, however, its
burners were equal in quality or superior to those presently on the market, and the
tests were subjectively influenced by members of the AGA, who were competitors of
the plaintiff. Assuming the same fact situation, except that the tests were administered
with complete objectivity, a per se approach would result in holding the defendants
culpable for refusing to provide gas for an unsafe burner.
29 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
30 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
31 See Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law 1958-1959, 59 COLUM.
L. REV. 843, 862 (1959); Note, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under the Antitrust
Laws, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1531, 1532 (1958). The Klor's court, in distinguishing Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (where one of the factors which led the
Court to decide that a labor union had not violated the Act, was that, as in Klors, the
restraint did not affect market prices), said: "[T]he Court in Apex recognized that the
Act is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is applied
only to a very limited extent to organizations, like labor unions, which normally have
other objectives." 359 U.S. at 213 n.7 (emphasis added). This language may be inter-
preted to condone a rule of reason approach in cases where the boycott is noncommer-
cially oriented.
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Educational excellence is determined not by the method of financ-
ing but by the quality of the program. . . . [T]he profit motive
might result in a more efficient use of resources, producing a better
product at a lower price. . . .There is nothing inherently evil in
making a profit and nothing commendable in operating at a
lOSS. 3 2
Thereupon it enjoined Middle States from applying its nonprofit
criterion to Webster.
The second count was actually a combination of two separate
theories: the common law of private associations, and the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. The general rule in regard
to private, voluntary associations is that membership is a privilege,
not a right, and, therefore, the courts will not provide a remedy for
arbitrary exclusion. 3 However, in 1930 Professor Chafee formu-
lated what he called the "Strangle-hold Policy." 34 He pointed out
that when the rule of judicial noninterference in the affairs of pri-
vate associations arose, exclusion from a social or fraternal society
resulted in little more than hurt feelings. But with the rise of
powerful trade and professional associations, exclusion might oper-
ate as a complete bar to earning a living at one's chosen occupation.
When an association gains such a "strangle-hold" in a particular
occupational area, judicial intervention becomes appropriate.
In Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society,35 the New
Jersey Supreme Court adopted Professor Chafee's theory. Therein
the local medical society refused to admit to membership a physi-
cian who, although licensed and qualified, did not meet the society's
requirement of 4 years attendance at a medical school approved by
the American Medical Association. The area hospitals required
that a physician be a member of the society in order to use their
facilities. On these facts, the court found that membership in the
society was an "economic necessity" for Dr. Falcone, and directed
the society to admit him. Thus, an exception to the rule of judicial
noninterference was found to exist when a private association has a
monopoly on the employment opportunities in a particular field .3
32 302 F. Supp. at 468. For a discourse on the merits of proprietary education,
see Manne, Scholar v. Profits, BARRON'S, Aug. 25, 1969, at 1.
33 6 AM. Jun. 2D Associations and Clubs § 18 (1963) & cases cited therein.
34 Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L. Rnv.
993, 1021-23 (1930).
35 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
36 See Hurwitz v. Directors Guild of America, Inc., 364 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1966);
James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1944); Kurk v. Medical Soc'y
of Queens County, Inc., 46 Misc. 2d 790, 260 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other
grounds, 24 App. Div. 897, 264 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1965).
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The Webster court was correct in affording relief under the
common law of private associations. As membership in Middle
States was concomitant with accreditation, a denial of accreditation
amounted to a denial of membership. Although until Webster the
common law remedy had been restricted to situations where mem-
bership was an economic necessity, judicial intervention is equally
as justifiable when an organization exercises complete control over
access to a commercial pursuit. Private associations, such as the re-
gional accrediting agencies, exist in areas of great public concern,
and their internal regulations - unlike those of secret societies and
churches37 - are properly subject to judicial scrutiny. But caution
must be exercised in the application of this supervisory power lest it
destroy the autonomy on which such private associations thrive.38
With respect to accrediting agencies, it is certainly better that edu-
cators possessing the required expertise, rather than the courts, set
the standards for accreditation and decide which institutions meet
them. The courts must carefully balance the association's power
and the degree of its abuse against the value of private autonomy.
When, as was true in Webster, the degree of power and extent of
abuse are sufficient to outweigh the deference paid to expertise,
judicial interference is most appropriate. 39
The final argument raised in Webster was premised upon a
line of cases holding that when a private association performs an
essentially governmental function, it falls subject to the due proc-
ess provisions of the Federal Constitution." Although a number
of arguments can be made for applying the public function ration-
ale to regional accrediting agencies, 4 this approach was rather sum-
37 See Chafee, supra note 34, at 1024. Professor Chafee analogizes the obscure
rules of secret societies and the theology of the churches to a "dismal swamp" where
judicial intervention is inadvisable.
381d. at 1027-28.
3 9 See Comment, The Legal Status of the Educational Accrediting Agency: Prob-
lems in Judicial Supervision and Government Regulation, 52 CORNELL LQ. 104,
115 (1966). Judicial intervention, of course, should be limited to cases in which the
action of the agency is either arbitrary or unreasonable. If the agency's conclusions
have some basis in reason, the opinion of the court should not be substituted for that
of the expert.
40 Cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Although these cases dealt with
factual situations wherein private organizations were performing - in a manner viola-
tive of the 14th amendment - functions normally allocated to state governments, the
principal of quasi-governmental function applies equally in the fifth amendment-federal
government context.
41 See Comment, supra note 39 passim, wherein the author reviews these argu-
ments. For present purposes, three are most relevant: First, some states adopt the
agency's standards in accrediting their public institutions. Second, the public tends to
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marily rejected in Parsons College v. North Central Association of
Colleges & Secondary Schools.42  However, relying heavily on the
agency's role in the distribution of federal funds, the Webster
court adopted it, finding that Webster's right to due process of law
had been violated by Middle States' application of its nonpropri-
etary criterion. This was an unwarranted extension of the quasi-
government theory. Middle States is not a private body perform-
ing what has traditionally been a governmental function. 43 It is a
private body performing what has always been a private activity.
The government's use of Middle States' expertise in implementing
some of its programs does not make Middle States an arm of gov-
ernment. The Constitution restricts only governmental activity; it
has left to the legislatures and the courts the task of providing rem-
edies against abusive private action.
Given the inappropriateness of the constitutional theory, the
question raised by Webster is which of the two remaining theories
relied upon by the court - antitrust and the common law of associ-
ations - represents the most appropriate rationale under which to
enjoin future abuses of power by noncommercially oriented associ-
ations? The common law affords relief when a private right has
been violated: The antitrust laws view restraints of competi-
tion as not only private, but public wrongs.1 This concept of pub-
lic injury is derived from the fact that often such restraints occur in
a context where the injured party is either unaware of the injury,
look on accreditation as a state rather than a private function. The third and strongest
argument is that federal aid-to-education funds are usually restricted to regionally ac-
credited schools. Thus, the decisions of the regional associations are adopted by the
government in determining whether or not a school or its students will receive federal
funds.
42271 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. 111. 1967). Parsons College lost its accreditation. It in-
voked a claim of due process on the theory that loss of accreditation would affect its
federal aid. In denying relief, the court said:
The fact that the acts of the Association in granting or denying accreditation
may have some effect under governmental programs of assistance to schools
or colleges does not subject it to the constitutional limits applicable to gov-
ernment, any more than a private employer whose decision to hire or fire
may affect the employee's eligibility for governmental unemployment com-
pensation. Id. at 70.
The court's analogy, however, disregards the association's monopolization of the ac-
creditation process. Even so, the requirements of due process were observed in Par-
sons, and the loss of accreditation was due to more than Parsons' having become a
proprietary institution. See Koerner, The Life and Hard Times of Parsons College,
SATURDAY REV., July 19, 1969, at 53. See also Salter v. New York Psychological
Ass'n, 14 N.Y.2d 100, 198 N.E.2d 250, 248 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1964).
43 See cases cited note 40 supra.
44 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1964); see 21 CONG. REc. 2461 (1890) (remarks
of Senator Sherman).
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or, although aware of the injury, cannot be expected to redress it.
In these situations there is a definite need for the Federal Govern-
ment to assume the role of parens patriae and enter the fray as a
party plaintiff. However, because accrediting agencies and similar
organizations act against the public interest only when they arbi-
trarily exclude individual institutional applicants, such applicants
may reasonably be expected to pursue common law remedies. Fur-
ther, the antitrust laws are, in large part, punitive measures, the
violation of which may result in treble damages45 and/or criminal
convictions.46 It seems incongruous to subject to those penalties an
organization, performing a socially beneficial function, whose only
"crime" may consist of an honest error in judgment. It is difficult
to conceive of a fact situation where the defendant's actions would
support the award of punitive damages at common law: the anti-
trust remedies are simply too harsh when applied in the present con-
text. Consequently, the common law of private associations with its
traditional civil remedies of both injunctive relief and damages fur-
nishes the most appropriate theory for granting relief in Webster-
type situations.47
JERoME N. SCANLAN
45 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
46 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
4 7 However, if the appellate courts uphold Webster on the antitrust theory, the
question will then arise whether the application of the Act to noncommercially orien-
ted boycotts in general presents problems beyond those posed by the Act's extremely
harsh damage provisions. How, for example, will the courts react if the Act is con-
sequently invoked against boycotts having a so-called "higher purpose" - those insti-
tuted by civil rights groups for example? One writer has suggested that where such a
noncommercial purpose exists, antitrust liability should depend upon a weighing of
the anticompetitive effects of the activity against the policy advantage of the purpose
and the likelihood of its realization through the means adopted. Coons, supra note
19, at 747. This type of rule, however, would place a court in the position of deciding
what is a sufficiently "worthy cause," and results in a subjective application of the law
that has no place in the antitrust area. When a noncommercial purpose exists, the
courts can obviate this difficulty by restricting the application of the Act to those situa-
tions where there is a monopolistic control of facilities, free access to which is vital to
the public welfare. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 25 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383
(1911); Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem
(pts. 1-2), 17 HARV. L. REv. 156, 217 (1903). This requirement of both monopoly
power and required access will enable the courts to enforce the Act against entities
similar to accrediting agencies, while exempting restraints directed toward a "higher
purpose."
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